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INVESTIGATIVE STOPS IN ALASKA: CAN
COLEMAN SURVIVE A MULTIFACTORED
BALANCE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Investigative stops are a prime example of the basic conflict un-
derlying most fourth amendment' jurisprudence: how both to limit
inappropriate police behavior and facilitate law enforcement. 2 The
conflict originates in an evenly matched ideological tug-of-war. One
policy pulls toward protecting citizens from the terrors of crime and
destructive behavior and anchors its concerns with a leniency toward
police conduct in pursuing this protection. Tugging in the opposite
direction with equal strength stands the desire to protect individuals
from intrusion by law enforcement personnel into private and personal
areas.3 Courts must reflect a concern for freedom from police intru-
sion by limiting the circumstances under which police may act to
those in which such action is truly necessary.
Alaska seemed to resolve the conflict between public safety and
private rights in Coleman v. State,4 in which the court limited investi-
gative stops to those situations in which there was "reasonable suspi-
cion that imminent public danger [existed] or serious harm to persons
or property [had] recently occurred."'5 Coleman did not authorize a
police procedure for all circumstances, only for those in which a stop
was truly necessary. The Coleman court enunciated a restrictive crite-
ria of imminent public danger rather than a broad criteria such as
"reasonable suspicion of any crime or wrongdoing."
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1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MxcH. L. REv. 1468,
1500-01 (1985).
3. These competing ideologies have been identified in other writings as the
"Crime Control Model" and the "Due Process Model." See generally H. PACKER,
THE Limrrs OF THE CRimiNAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968).
4. 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
5. Id. at 46.
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The pronouncement of the Coleman standard failed to silence the
debate over investigative stops in Alaska. Instead, the battle has
shifted to how this standard should be administered. Two primary
methods for implementing Coleman are available. The two methods
are ideologically neutral and should not necessarily be paired with
either the law and order or individual liberty ideology. Under one
methodology, Coleman could be administered as a categorical exclu-
sion in which investigative stops can be performed only if there is a
reasonable suspicion of certain offenses, regardless of other circum-
stances. The other methodology would implement Coleman on a case-
by-ease basis in which the court considers all the circumstances of a
particular police and citizen contact to determine whether the stop
was reasonable.
After initially using a categorical exclusion, Alaska courts have
settled on a case-by-case analysis. Although Coleman is still cited as
Alaska's seminal case for investigative stops, the courts have largely
failed to administer it in a way that requires the imminent public dan-
ger or serious harm standard to be met. The recital of the Coleman
standard is thus inappropriate. If the Alaska courts wish to continue
to apply the Coleman doctrine as the investigative stop standard, they
should be careful to give special weight to Coleman's limitations in
their case-by-case balancing. If, however, the Coleman standard is
deemed no longer appropriate, it should be overruled.
II. THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP DEFINED
For the purposes of search and seizure law, courts have identified
three fundamental types of contact between the police and private citi-
zens: (1) a generalized request for information; (2) an investigative
stop;6 and (3) an arrest.7 A "request for information" is an on-the-
scene investigation of bystanders" or a request for identification. 9 Such
an encounter is not a fourth amendment "seizure" because it is
deemed to be an insignificant intrusion.' 0 An "arrest" occurs when
the individual contacted is taken into formal police custody in order
6. This procedure is also known as an investigatory stop, a Terry stop or a pre-
arrest investigative detention.
7. Howard v. State, 664 P.2d 603, 608 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Note, The Erod-
ing Force of the Investigatory Stop Under Fourth Amendment Constitutional Doctrine,
17 VAL. U.L. REv. 471, 476 (1983) [hereinafter Eroding Force].
8. See Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, C.J.,
concurring).
9. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
10. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980). A request for
identification may become a seizure if it satisfies the criteria in other ways. See 3 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
§ 9.2(f), at 375 n. 112 (2d ed. 1987); Eroding Force, supra note 7, at 476. But see
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that the person may be held to answer for the commission of a crime.II
The investigative stop, lying somewhere in between a request for infor-
mation and an arrest, has no simple, fixed definition in constitutional
criminal procedure law.
The investigative stop is distinguished from a request for informa-
tion by the objective belief of the individual contacted that he or she is
not free to leave the scene of the contact and is under a duty to abide
fully with the commands of the law enforcement officials. 12 The dis-
tinction between an investigative stop and an arrest, both "seizures"
for the purposes of the fourth amendment and its counterpart in the
Alaska Constitution,13 is much less clear.14 Generally, the investiga-
tive stop is distinguished from an arrest based on the stop's investiga-
tory purpose and lower magnitude of intrusion. The practical result is
that the investigative stop requires only a "reasonable suspicion,"
whereas an arrest requires "probable cause."' s
The police procedure of "stop and frisk," from which investiga-
tive stops originate, has existed in some form since early English com-
mon law. 16 However, the procedure was not accorded constitutional
status in the United States until the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in
Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 364 n.16 (Alaska 1983) (declining to decide whether a
request for identification is a seizure).
11. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.25.160 (1990). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 479 (1963).
12. Waring, 670 P.2d at 364-65; Howard v. State, 664 P.2d 603, 608 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983); Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 554; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
Eroding Force, supra note 7, at 478-79. See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 10,
§ 9.2(h), at 401-22.
13. Alaska Constitution article I, section 14 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other prop-
erty, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or airmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
ALAsKA CoNST. art. I, § 14.
14. Howard v. State, 664 P.2d 603, 608 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Williamson, The
Dimensions of Seizure.: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771,
777 (1982).
15. Williamson, supra note 14, at 777. See State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 10, § 9.2(e), at 370. See also Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 515 (Alaska Ct. App.
1988) (investigative stop does not require reading of Miranda rights). See generally
UNIF. ARREST ACT §§ 2, 3 (1942); Williamson, supra note 14, at 802-17.
16. Lippman, Stop and Frisk- The Triumph of Law Enforcement over Private
Rights, 24 CRuM. L. BuLL. 24, 24-25 (1988); Stem, Stop and Frisk An Historical
Answer to a Modem Problem, 58 J. CRim. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 532, 532
(1967).
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Terry v. Ohio. 17 The Terry court acknowledged that a "stop and frisk"
was a "seizure" for the purposes of the fourth amendment.18 The
Court, however, went on to exempt investigative stops from the prob-
able cause requirement of arrests. 19 Interpreting the fourth amend-
ment broadly, the Court found that the probable cause requirement
applied only to the warrant clause,20 while other searches and seizures
were subject only to a "reasonableness" requirement.21
III. THE ALASKA INVESTIGATIVE STOP DOCTNE: COLEMAN
AND "IMMINENT PUBLIC DANGER"
In interpreting article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, the
courts in Alaska began, independently of the federal courts,22 to for-
mulate a court-sanctioned standard for brief investigative detentions.
Prior to Terry, the Alaska Supreme Court had permitted investigative
detentions in Goss v. State23 and Maze v. State.24 In each case, the
court held that police officers could stop and question a person when
17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 10, § 9.1, at 334. See also
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-38 (1967) (balancing the need to
search against intrusiveness and establishing a standard of probable cause for inspec-
tion warrants); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-78 (1949) (establishing a
groundwork for the recognition of temporary detentions).
18. 392 U.S. at 19.
19. Id at 20.
20. "[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The "reasonableness clause" in the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Lipp-
man, supra note 16, at 28; Eroding Force, supra note 7, at 474. See also 3 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 10, § 9.1(d), at 340-41 (discussing the confusing relationship between the
warrant clause and the reasonableness clause). See generally Sundby, A Return to
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L.
REv. 383, 395-97 (1988).
22. It is not unusual for states to provide broader protection against searches and
seizures than the United States Supreme Court does, even when the language of the
state constitution is virtually identical to the federal provision. See 1 W. RINOEL,
SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 2.6 (2d ed. 1989). States are
allowed to develop rules governing searches and seizures, provided that such rules are
consistent with the individual's federal constitutional rights. Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 38-39 (1963); 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES & IMMUNITIEs 81 (2d ed.
1974). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (noting that "a state is free
as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those
this court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards") (emphasis in
original).
23. 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964), overruled
on other grounds, Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 687 (Alaska 1970).
24. 425 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1967).
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there were "suspicious circumstances" which warranted further inves-
tigation of that person by the police officer.25 In neither case, how-
ever, did the court articulate any standard for reasonableness under
article I, section 14.26
After the reasonable suspicion standard was announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Teny, the Alaska courts also articu-
lated a doctrine for "investigative stops." In Coleman v. State,27 the
first Alaska case 8 after Terry to examine the stop and frisk doctrine,
the Alaska Supreme Court cautiously adopted the Teny rationale but
pronounced a stricter standard.29
In Coleman, the police officers stopped a car after it was seen
leaving a seldom-used area near which a rape and burglary had just
been reported. The driver appeared to match the description of the
assailant.3 0 Considering Goss, Maze, Teny and Adams v. Williams,31
the court stated a principle "permitting temporary detention for ques-
tioning in certain cases, i.e., cases where the police officer has a reason-
able suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to
25. Iad at 238.
26. See Feldman, Search and Seizure in Alaska. A Comprehensive Review, 7
UCLA-ALAsKA L. Rav. 75, 103 (1977).
27. 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
28. The Alaska Supreme Court had previously expressed some dissatisfaction
with Terry and its progeny in Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228, 233 n.15 (1972). In that
case, the court noted that many members of the United States Supreme Court had
begun to reevaluate Terry. The Mattern court also retreated somewhat from Goss,
citing the lack of a statute permitting investigative stops. The court did not consider
fully Terry or Goss because it concluded that the police actions at issue did not amount
to an investigative stop. Id. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Erwin, who
would later write for the court in Coleman, applied Terry, Goss, Maze and Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), and stated that it was proper to stop an "obviously
suspicious individual" as part of a legitimate stop and frisk. Mattern, 500 P.2d at 2 5-
36 (Erwin, J., concurring).
29. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.
30. Id. at 42-43.
31. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Adams was the first case to apply the Terry stop doctrine
to a reasonable suspicion of the commission of mere possessory offenses rather thanimminent, violent offenses. In Adams, the stop was based on an unverified informant's
tip that Williams, the occupant of a nearby vehicle, was transporting illegal drugs and
had a gun at his waist. The investigating officer approached the vehicle and requested
that Williams open the door. When Williams rolled down the window, the officer
reached in and removed a revolver from Williams' waistband. Williams was arrested
for unlawful possession of the pistol. A subsequent search incident to the arrest un-
covered substantial quantities of heroin and additional weapons. Id. at 144-45. The
Supreme Court upheld the admission of all evidence discovered in the search. Id. at
149. The Court rooted its investigative stop analysis on the practical circumstances of
daily police work, a belief whereby the police are to be afforded greater latitude in
order to solve difficult or frustrating crimes. Iad at 148. Compare this concern with
the rationale in Terry that stops are justified by "necessarily swift action" required to
abate dangerous situations. 392 U.S. at 20.
1990]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
persons or property has recently occurred. ' 32 Thus, the investigative
stop doctrines articulated in Coleman and Terry defined "unreasona-
ble searches and seizures" differently. Under the Coleman doctrine,
the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that an investigative stop would
be "reasonable" only in the prevention of imminently dangerous
crimes or in solving recently perpetrated serious harms. 33
The Coleman standard was more restrictive than Terry and was
apparently intended to apply to only a narrow range of situations?34
In a footnote, the court wrote that the Terry doctrine should not be
extended beyond "situations requiring immediate police response to
protect the public."'35 The court was addressing the concerns ex-
pressed by Justice Brennan in Adams v. Williams 36 and by Judge
Friendly in the lower court opinion in that case.37 Judge Friendly,
dissenting from the lower court's opinion in Adams, expressed concern
that the expansion of Terry to reasonable suspicion of offenses that did
not require immediate police response, such as drug possession, would
open "the sluicegates for serious and unintended erosion of the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. ' 38 Since Coleman's actions and the
nature of the alleged offense clearly fit within the narrow criterion, the
court did not examine further the concern for Terry's potential
overexpansiveness.3 9
The Alaska standard articulated in Coleman is also distinguish-
able from the standards of other states. Several states have included
32. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
33. See Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 700 (Alaska 1978); Feldman, supra note 26,
at 105 ("Thus, in Alaska, the police officer may make a stop and frisk on less than
probable cause only within a narrow range of situations .... "). Later cases also
reflected the belief that Alaska had adopted Terry only on a limited basis. See, e.g.,
Ozenna v. State, 619 P.2d 477, 479 (Alaska 1980). The idea of limiting Terry stops to
certain offenses had been previously suggested by federal criminal procedure commen-
tators. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888 (1975) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (citing LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution, 67 MICH. L. REv.
39, 65-66 (1968)).
34. The Coleman standard is also more in line with some of the commentators on
investigative stops. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 9.2(c), at 360 ("The Terry rule
should be expressly limited to investigation of serious offenses.").
35. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 n.17.
36. 407 U.S. 143, 151-53 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 35-39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
38. Id at 39. Judge Friendly's dissent also appears to be the source of the Cole-
man court's limiting language. Explaining the preferred limits of Terry, Judge
Friendly stated that "[i]t was meant for the serious cases of imminent danger or of
harm recently perpetrated to persons or property." Id. In his dissent, Justice Bren-
nan quoted Judge Friendly's opinion at length. Adams, 407 U.S. at 151-53.
39. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 45 n.17. See Feldman, supra note 26, at 104-05.
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investigative stop guidelines in their criminal procedure codes.40
Alaska's Coleman doctrine, however, is rare among state investigative
stop standards, since it is more restrictive than Terry without a statu-
tory commandment.41 The Alaska Legislature acknowledged the
Coleman procedure during the discussion of "lawful stops," and re-
ferred to Coleman in the commentary, 42 but gave no guidance as to
how Coleman should be administered.
IV. THE COLEMAN STANDARD: Two POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS
As with many court-announced doctrines, Coleman appeared to
be a satisfactory resolution of the investigative stop issue only until
attempts were made to apply it. The element of "imminent public
danger or serious harm to persons or property" lends itself to two
plausible administrative interpretations.43 The first is a categorical ex-
clusion. All offenses that do not meet the "danger" requirement can-
not provide the basis for the reasonable suspicion needed for a legal
40. See, eg., N.Y. CIm. PRoc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1990)
(originally limited to felonies and class A misdemeanors, but later amended to include
all misdemeanors); OR. REv. STAT. § 131.615(1) (1984) (no preventive stops; stops
limited to completed crimes); Note, What Standard Governs Investigative Stops in Vir-
ginia?, 9 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 313 (1987). Cf MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGN-
MENT PROC. § 1 10.2(1)(a)-(c) (allowing stops of: (a) those suspected of offenses
involving danger of forcible injury to persons or damage to property; (b) witnesses to
such offenses; and (c) those suspected of previously committing offenses. In all situa-
tions the stop must be necessary for the purpose of identification or verifying informa-
tion.). See also 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 22, § 2.6, at 2-41 to 2-42 (2d ed. 1989)
(discussing the varying nature of state doctrines).
41. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 9.2(c), at 357 ("With rare exception, cases
declaring that the stop was improper because of the nature of the offense under inves-
tigation have been decided upon a statutory provision limiting stops to the investiga-
tion of certain crimes."). Cf State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1988) (stating Terry should apply to all crimes); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash.2d
1, 6, 726 P.2d 445, 448 (1986) (an offense need not be serious to warrant an investiga-
tive stop). Alaska's only stablemate with respect to investigative stops is West Vir-
ginia, whose court-enunciated doctrine limits investigative stops to the investigation of
violent criminal activity. State v. Duvernoy, 156 W. Va. 578, 195 S.E.2d 631 (1973).
Most courts have restricted Terry to criminal activity. 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 22,
§ 13.1(c), at 13-5. For a review of the policy as practiced by the Ninth Circuit, see
Note, Criminal Law in the Ninth Circuit, 13 LOYOLA L.A.L. REv. 591, 622-27 (1980).
A stop and frisk statute was recommended by the President's Commission in 1967.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 95 (1967).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370 (1989). See 2 S. JouRNAL Supp. No. 47, at 129-
31 (June 12, 1978).
43. Numerous interpretations are possible. However, it has been suggested for
other areas of fourth amendment procedure that these two may be the only successful
tactics. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1472. But see Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in
the Balance" Accurately Setting the Scales Through The Least Intrusive Alternative
Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1988) (proposing that the investigative stop
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investigative: stop. Such an application is commonly known as a
"bright lines" or "clear rules" approach. The second option makes
imminent public danger merely a factor in a case-by-case analysis.
This method is often labeled the "sliding scale" approach.44
These administrative approaches should not be confused with the
previously discussed ideological dichotomy between law and order and
individual rights. On the contrary, these two administrative ap-
proaches to applying Coleman are ideologically neutral, generic mod-
els.45 The bright lines approach reflects a specific ideology only by
virtue of where the lines are drawn. For example, an advocate of indi-
vidual privacy may draw the line at reasonable suspicion of "recently
perpetrated capital offenses." An advocate of the law and order ap-
proach may draw the bright line at reasonable suspicion of "any crime
or misdemeanor of any class." Similarly, the sliding scale will reflect
an ideology only upon the evaluation of a particular case and the de-
termination of what is reasonable police behavior.4" Although a court
using a sliding scale has the potential to condone all police conduct, it
also has the power to condemn it.
Administering Coleman through a bright lines approach would
result in a unique stop procedure. To the extent Coleman ordained a
categorical exclusion of investigative stops not involving an "imminent
public danger," the Coleman doctrine would be a true limitation on
police procedure, as compared to the generally permissive federal doc-
trine.47 To obtain such a categorical exclusion, the Coleman test
would have to be administered as a two-pronged test. The first neces-
sary condition would be a suspicion of imminent public danger or seri-
ous danger to persons or property. If and only if that condition were
satisfied could a court move on to the next prong: examining the rea-
sonableness of the suspicion.
Using a sliding scale approach, the imminent public danger re-
quirement would become merely one of the factors that are analyzed
in determining the overall reasonableness of a stop. Through this
method, several broad factors, such as imminence, necessity and de-
gree of danger, would all be considered and balanced against each
other to determine if the police conduct was proper. The problem
with this approach is that the imminent public danger factor could
doctrine will be manageable if restricted to the least intrusive alternative action of law
officers). See generally Sundby, supra note 21, at 414-47 (offering several theoretical
models).
44. See, LaFave, "Case-by-case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures"
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 127 (1975). See generally Bradley, supra
note 2, at 1481-98.
45. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1472 n.17, 1501.
46. See generally Bradley, supra note 2, at 1498-1501.
47. Feldman, supra note 26, at 103-04.
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easily be balanced away by any other factor. Such a result is not nec-
essarily bad, but it lessens Coleman's distinctive quality48 and could
lead to the "serious erosion" of constitutional protections that Justice
Brennan and Judge Friendly were concerned about in Terry.49
The Alaska courts need to choose one of these two methods. The
alternative is the confusion in which the federal system finds itself, as
the courts attempt to use a bright lines approach and maintain a flexi-
ble approach at the same time.50 The United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated the necessity of clear rules.51 In Dunaway v. New
York,52 the Court specifically recognized the importance of clear rules
with respect to Teny stops: "A single, familiar standard is essential to
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to re-
flect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront."'5 3 Nonetheless, the Court has
simultaneously obscured these rules with broad ranging exceptions
when a specific application of the rules appears unjust.54 This confu-
sion is as prevalent in investigative stop law as in other areas of fourth
amendment jurisprudence. The evolution of the Terry doctrine illus-
trates how numerous exceptions have obscured the clear rules; excep-
tions have expanded the doctrine from a narrow exclusion to one
describing a broad range of activity.
48. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
50. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 1470. In commenting on the entirety of Supreme
Court fourth amendment jurisprudence, Professor Bradley wrote:
[T]he Court strives to justify such police behavior by stretching existing doc-
trine to accommodate it. Herein lies the inherent contradiction, and source
of confusion, in fourth amendment law: The Court tries on the one hand to
lay down clear rules for the police to follow in every situation while also
trying to respond flexibly, or 'reasonably,' to each case because a hard-line
approach would lead to exclusion of evidence. Since the rules are not clear
and since, even if they were, it is virtually impossible to lay down a rule that
anticipates all potential cases, the police engage in behavior that does not
conform to the rules but that strikes the Court as having been essentially
reasonable. Given the Court's predilection for clear-cut rules, however, sim-
ply declaring such conduct "reasonable" and leaving it at that is not enough.
Instead, the Court offers a detailed explanation as to how the police behavior
really did conform to the old rule (and in so doing, changes the contours of
the old rule), or creates a new rule to justify the behavior. Naturally, such a
holding spawns a new litigation, which leads to a new opinion, which leads
to a new rule, etc.
Id. (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984); New York v. Bel-
ton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
52. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
53. Id at 213-14.




The Terry holding was very limited.55 It allowed a "narrowly
drawn authority" to permit a brief pat-down search for weapons based
on a police officer's reasonable suspicion that the party being searched
was armed and dangerous.5 6 The Court created this exception because
it was thought necessary for police to be able to respond to potentially
life-threatening situations in which there was no time to develop prob-
able cause to arrest.57
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the Terry stop doc-
trine beyond imminently violent offenses to possessory offenses.58 The
Terry stop ceased to be based on the "necessarily swift action"5 9 re-
quired to confront dangerous situations. 60 Later decisions continued
to emphasize convenience over immediacy, 61 as the Court expanded
Terry from at narrowly drawn exception to a doctrine descriptive of a
wide range of activity.62 In United States v. Place, the Court employed
55. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 10, § 9.1(b), at 338. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16 (1968) ("Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in
detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he
confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.").
56. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
57. Id at 30. The authorization of Terry stops can be seen as an implicit priori-
tization of the crime control model. See PACKER, supra note 3, at 184-85. Note the
similar concern of Alaska courts, expressed in Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 366
(Alaska 1983).
58. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See infra note 65 and accompanying
text.
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
60. Under Adams, the stop could be based on a tip. Therefore, the party stopped
need not have acted suspiciously nor even been observed directly by the detaining
officer. Lippmann, supra note 16, at 32. Compare the Adams rationale to Terry's
condition that the police action be "predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of
the officer on the beat." 392 U.S. at 20. See Eroding Force, supra note 7, at 494 n.132.
It also appears that the reliance on an unverified tip contravenes the requirement of
Terry for reasonable suspicion based on "specific and articulable facts" and the of-
ficer's personal observation. 392 U.S. at 21. See Eroding Force, supra note 7, at 494.
61. For example, the doctrine was extended to completed crimes. See United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (allowing the investigative stop of a suspect for
an armed robbery that had been committed two weeks earlier). In such cases, the
threat of immediate danger to the police is not nearly as great as the threat which the
Terry court found so compelling. In Hensley, the court realized that necessity, the
essential element in Terry, was often absent in the investigation of completed crimes.
The Hensley court wrote:
A stop to investigate an already completed crime does not necessarily pro-
mote the interest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate sus-
pected ongoing criminal activity. Similarly, the exigent circumstances which
require a police officer to step in before a crime is committed or completed
are not necessarily as pressing long afterwards.
Id at 228.
62. Spillane, Frisking the Fourth Amendment, HUM. RTs., Spring 1982, at 23. See
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 704 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This trend
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a test which balanced "the nature and quality of the intrusion on [per-
sonal security] against the importance of the governmental interests
alleged to justify the intrusion."'63
The Court has identified several important governmental interests
which justify investigative stops and has used these interests to out-
weigh the intrusiveness of relatively severe police conduct. 4 These
interests are often associated with general crime prevention and detec-
tion.65 The Supreme Court gave special emphasis to the goals of stem-
ming the flow of illegal aliens66 and narcotics.67 In one case, the Court
stretched the doctrine to include school discipline, preservation of or-
der and security in schools as sufficiently important governmental in-
terests.65 As with other fourth amendment law issues,69 the Supreme
Court's investigative stop doctrine is replete with various exceptions.
These exceptions are frequently so concerned with the goal of preserv-
ing "clear rules" that they fail to make practical sense. The "no
seizure doctrine," demonstrates this phenomenon. 70 That doctrine
provides that as long as a person being questioned remains free to dis-
regard the questions and walk away, "there has been no intrusion
is also common among state doctrines. Spillane, supra, at 25, 47-48. Indeed, Spillane
describes it as a "trend gone out of control." Id at 48.
63. 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (seizure of luggage violated fourth amendment). See
also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228.
64. See e.g., United States v. Montoya deHernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
(governmental interest in stopping smuggling outweighed intrusiveness of detention of
a traveler at the boarder and a rectal examination). See also Comment, An Emerging
New Standard for Warrantless Searches and Seizures Based on Terry v. Ohio, 35 MER-
CER L. RvV. 647, 672-73, 679 (1984) [hereinafter New Standard]. But see United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 889 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas objected to any type of expansive test for non-intrusiveness, stating that "the
nature of the test permits the police to interfere ... with a multitude of law-abiding
citizens whose only transgression may be a nonconformist appearance or attitude." Id.
65. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) ("The Fourth Amendment
does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a
criminal to escape."). Other important interests include the safety of the police of-
ficers and the public.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Martines-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551-64 (1976);
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79. See also Immigration & Nat. Serv. v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210 (1984) (factory surveys conducted to identify illegal aliens working with-
out authorization found not violative of fourth amendment rights).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya deHernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538-39
(1985); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
68. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985).
69. See Bradley, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Lippman, supra note 16, at 34-38; Butterfoss, Bright Line
Seizures: The Need For Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Be-
gins, 79 J. C iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1988).
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upon that person's liberty or privacy that would under the Constitu-
tion require particularized and objective justification. '71 With it, the
Court expanded the scope of brief encounters between police and indi-
viduals in which no fourth amendment rights were implicated. The
Court held that certain police activity, usually when directed at com-
batting topically sensitive behavior, such as drug smuggling, does not
amount to a stop at all.72
A. Policy Favoring Each Approach
Sound policy arguments can be made for both the bright lines and
the sliding scale approach. Proponents of the bright lines approach
argue that the fluid analysis of general reasonableness underlying the
sliding scale approach is unacceptable because the delicate balance be-
tween efficient police work and the individual's rights requires specific
guidelines. 73 They contend that a fluid standard is ill-suited to facili-
tating police fieldwork. Although it may be geared toward validating
practical police activity, a flexible standard offers little guidance to law
enforcement officers on how to model behavior in the field.74 The re-
sult is uncertainty.75 Treating the investigative stop as a strict exclu-
sion or bright line would better allow for quick and consistent
decisions in the field. 76
71. Mendenhall v. United States, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
72. Id. at 553-54. See also Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1988); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 10, § 9.2(h), at 401-22;
Lippman, supra note 16, at 34-38. But see Anderson, Everything You Always Wanted
to Know About Terry Stops - But Thought It Was a Violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment to Stop and Ask, ARMY LAW., Feb. 1988, at 25, 29 (noting that Mendenhall, as a
plurality opinion, has uncertain effect).
Many of these cases involve investigative stops in airports of individuals fitting
drug courier proffles. These "airport stop" cases generally allow considerable latitude
in law enforcement agents to question persons based only on their fitting a standard,
generalized description of previous drug couriers. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547
n.1; Spillane, supra note 64, at 48. But see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983)
(circumstances amounted to arrest). Perhaps because of Alaska's dependency on air
travel, Alaska courts frequently confront this issue. See, eg., State v. Garcia, 752 P.2d
478 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
73. Sundby, supra note 21, at 416-17.
74. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 9.1(d), at 343-44 (noting that ad hoc "slide
rule" determinations are ill-suited for day-to-day police work). See Schwartz, Stop
and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE Sc. 448 (1967).
75. Sundby, supra note 21, at 416-17.
76. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 9.1(d), at 343-44; Sundby, supra note 21, at
416-17. See generally Butterfoss, supra note 70, at 437-43.
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Proponents of a case by case analysis argue that a multifactored
sliding scale is better because the police constantly face unique combi-
nations of circumstances. 77 Permitting an officer broad discretion in
the field based on his or her training and experience better suits the
reality of police work than does trying to pigeonhole a situation into a
bright line category. 78 Moreover, proponents of a case-by-case analy-
sis contend that an inquiry into general reasonableness better con-
forms to the demands of the fourth amendment. 79
B. Ebona: The Bright Lines Approach
The initial applications of the Coleman doctrine appeared to
favor the bright lines approach. The Alaska Supreme Court first reit-
erated the Coleman standard in Ebona v. State 80 in which it employed
a two-pronged analysis for examining the validity of an investigative
stop. First, a court must "satisf[y] the Coleman investigative stop pre-
requisite which requires that the officer have a suspicion that immi-
nent public danger exists."'' s Second, the court must independently 2
examine the reasonableness of the suspicion using the objective test of
Terry.8 3 The two analyses were separate and distinct: the imminent
public danger condition (the Coleman prerequisite) had to be fulfilled
before the court could turn to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
Subsequent rulings on the Coleman doctrine reaffirmed the bright
line by employing Ebona's two-pronged analysis. 84 In Howard v.
77. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1481; 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9, § 9.1(d), at 343-
44.
78. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1483.
79. Id. at 1481-83.
80. 577 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1978).
81. Id at 701. In Ebona, the police officers noticed a man who appeared intoxi-
cated enter an automobile and drive away; an hour and twenty minutes later they
observed his car at an intersection. The court stated that driving while intoxicated
was adequately serious and imminently dangerous. Id at 699-701.
82. "Remaining for resolution is the question whether Officer Smith's suspicion
that an imminent public danger existed was reasonable in light of all the facts known
to the officer prior to the investigative stop of Ebona's vehicle." Id at 701. See Lar-
son v. State, 669 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Metzker v. State, 658 P.2d
147, 149 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Hubert v. State, 638 P.2d 677, 685-87 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1981).
83. That is, whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964)). Accord Brown v. State, 684 P.2d 874, 879 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984).
84. See, eg., Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 365 (Alaska 1983); Metzker v. State,
658 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); Hubert v. State, 638 P.2d 677, 685
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
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State, 5 the court of appeals identified five factors distinguishing inves-
tigative stops from arrests. It stated the "Coleman prerequisite" was
an absolute condition which must be fulfilled: "First, the court must
consider the purpose for the stop and, specifically, the kind of criminal
activity being investigated. In Alaska investigatory stops are limited
to the investigation of crimes of violence or crimes involving serious
and substantial loss to property. '8 6
In Brown v. State,8 7 the court of appeals also applied Coleman as
a two-part test and implied that Coleman may call for a categorical
exclusion for less serious offenses.88 After holding that a very recent
burglary was sufficiently serious harm to property to satisfy the Cole-
man prerequisite, 89 the court implied that the Coleman doctrine may
categorically exclude less serious property offenses such as "shoplifting
or other casual theft." 90
C. Obscuring the Bright Lines
Initially, Alaska courts construed the Coleman doctrine to allow
investigative stops only in cases where an imminent public danger was
easily demonstrable. These dangers included violent crimes,91 armed
robbery92 attd drunk driving.93 As discussed below, Alaska gradually
obscured this bright line approach, however, abandoning a strict two
pronged analysis and allowing factors such as the amount of intrusion
and degree of suspicion to override weaknesses in the Coleman
prerequisite.
One result of the equal consideration of all these factors was that
if a particular factor was very compelling, it could compensate for the
weaknesses of the others. For example, police were allowed to be
highly intrusive during a stop, provided that the stop was based on a
85. 664 P.2d 603 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
86. Id. at 609. The court continued:
Second, the stop must be for a limited and specific inquiry .... Third, the
stop must be of brief duration .... Fourth, the stop must not require the
person stopped to travel an appreciable distance. Fifth, the force used in
effectuating the stop must be proportional to the risk reasonably foreseen by
the officer at the time he makes the stop.
Id. at 609-10.
87. 684 P.2d 874 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
88. Id at 878-79.
89. Id
90. Id at 879.
91. See, eg., Brown v. State, 684 P.2d 874 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Howard v.
State, 664 P.2d 603 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
92. See, eg., Uptegraft v. State, 621 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1980).
93. See, eg., Effenbeck v. State, 700 P.2d 811 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Larson v.




high degree of suspicion of a serious harm.94 Valid investigative stops
have included blocking off an exit by police cars95 and being hand-
cuffed and held at gunpoint.96 Courts have also allowed searches of
checked luggage at airports on a fairly low quantum of suspicion, cit-
ing the relatively low level of intrusion which results from examining
property not attached to the person.97
Perhaps the most significant change from the initial strict two-
part analysis of Coleman came when courts began treating Coleman as
no more restrictive than the federal investigative stop doctrine. That
is, the distinctive requirement limiting stops to certain suspected of-
fenses became increasingly insignificant. Despite a stated adherence to
Justice Brennan's concern for extension of investigative stops to pos-
sessory offenses,98 and despite the repeated assertion that Alaska's
Coleman doctrine is more restrictive than the federal law,99 courts
have authorized Coleman stops of persons suspected of crimes such as
drug possession'0 and receipt of stolen property. 101 Such offenses had
been inappropriate for investigative stops under a bright line, immi-
nent public danger requirement: even in examining practical neces-
sity, the Coleman court apparently said that mere possession of
contraband would not create a situation requiring immediate law en-
forcement when there was less than probable cause.102
In order to include possessory crimes among those suitable for
investigative stops, the courts have interpreted Coleman inconsis-
tently. This inconsistency is most acute in cases concerning drug pos-
session.103 In T Gibson v. State,104 the court rejected Gibson's
94. Courts generally allow substantial force to be used during the course of an
investigative stop, because Coleman stops are limited to situations creating great risks
of violence. Howard, 664 P.2d at 610.
95. Hubert v. State, 638 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). See 3 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 10, § 9.2(d), at 364-66.
96. Howard, 664 P.2d at 609, 611.
97. See Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1307 n.9 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). For a
federal case on this point see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 717-18 n.5 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
98. See Coleman, 553 P.2d 40, 46 n.17 (Alaska 1976); State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452,
454 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). For a discussion of State v. G.B., see infra notes 115-35
and accompanying text.
99. Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 365 (Alaska 1983) (concluding that the Cole-
man test is more restrictive than the federal Terry doctrine); Effenbeck v. State, 700
P.2d 811, 815 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Brown v. State, 684 P.2d 874, 879 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1984).
100. See, eg., T. Gibson v. State, 708 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
101. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 684 P.2d 874 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
102. Coleman, 553 P.2d 40, 46-47 (Alaska 1976).
103. Ironically, drug possession is used in Judge Friendly's dissent in Adams as an
example of an offense which should not be the predicate for an investigative stop.
Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). This
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argument that possession of small quantities of drugs was not a suffi-
ciently imminent public danger to satisfy the Coleman/Ebona
doctrine.
Properly understood the restrictions [Coleman and Ebona] place on
investigatory stops are aimed at preventing unreasonable interfer-
ence with the "person" of the suspect .... Brennan's argument as
advanced and as adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court relates pri-
marily to the "frisk" aspect of the stop and frisk, not the initial
stop.105
The possible ramifications of this dicta are numerous. If the im-
minent public danger requirement were to apply only to frisks, then
seizures, even of individuals, could occur on a fairly permissive reason-
able suspicion standard. This would be inappropriate, because the
danger of "pretext seizures" is equal to that of "pretext searches." 106
The concerns for unreasonable police intrusion apply equally to the
stop and the frisk. Moreover, applying an equal standard to stops and
frisks is more consistent with previous Alaska decisions.107 The
Alaska courts have previously applied the Coleman standard to stops
independent of searches.108 The application of a dual standard for
stops and frisks is unprecedented.
concern was later reiterated in Justice Brennan's dissent in Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 151 (1972).
104. 708 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (This case will be referred to as T Gib-
son so as not to confuse it with W. Gibson v. State, 789 P.2d 383 (Alaska Ct. App.
1990), which is discussed infra at notes 138-42 and accompanying text.). In T Gib-
son, an airline employee alerted drug enforcement officials of a package that the em-
ployee suspected contained drugs. The drug enforcement officials brought the
package before a scent-detection dog which signalled positive. A search warrant was
issued on the basis of this evidence. Id. at 709-10.
105. Id at 711. See Christianson v. State, 734 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987) (citing T. Gibson for this proposition and holding that the defendant could not
argue the invalidity of the stop of a third person because Coleman protects only
against unreasonable stops "of [the defendant's] person," not somebody else's).
106. Pretext searches, where the individual is searched in hope of finding evidence
of criminal activity other than that which prompted the stop, caused Justice Brennan
concern in his Adams dissent. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 153 (1972) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d. Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
The crux of Judge Friendly's opinion was that Terry intended only "to free a police
officer from the rigidity of a rule that would prevent his doing anything to a man
reasonably suspected of being about to commit or having just committed a crime of
violence, no matter how grave the problem or impelling the need for swift action." Id.
107. See, eg., Metzker v. State, 658 P.2d 147, 149 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (imply-
ing Terry should be limited in Alaska to crimes of danger); Effenbeck v. State, 700
P.2d 811, 815 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (Coleman doctrine limits investigative stops to
situations where "police action is necessary to intercept and prevent injurious con-
duct" and not to "seize drugs or gambling paraphernalia.").
108. See Free v. State, 614 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Alaska 1980).
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The court of appeals has similarly held that receiving stolen prop-
erty, even though a possessory offense, is a valid prerequisite offense
for a Coleman stop.109 The courts have justified such a ruling on the
grounds that possession of stolen goods constitutes serious harm to
property. However, Coleman requires that serious harm to property
have recently occurred. Again, the lack of immediacy of the investiga-
tion might invalidate the stop under an Ebona-style bright lines test.10
The court of appeals has further obscured the imminent public
danger bright line by holding an investigative stop valid even though it
was predicated only on part of the investigation of a recent, serious,
dangerous offense. The court held that the incident immediately pre-
cipitating the stop need not itself be dangerous."' With this holding,
many possessory and minor offenses may be brought under the Cole-
man/Ebona doctrine as ancillary to more serious offenses.
Courts must be wary of stretching the doctrine to fit troubling
scenarios, because such stretching sets the precedent for broad-ranging
police conduct." 2 Although illegal possession of drugs and stolen
goods makes an emotionally compelling case for special treatment,
such cases would fall outside the exception to the probable cause re-
quirement provided by Coleman. Coleman did not intend to validate a
police procedure for use in the investigation of all crimes. Rather,
Coleman meant to validate a practice for use only in situations in
which the reasonable suspicion was of an imminent public danger or
serious harm to persons or property. Absent a legislative empower-
ment, it is difficult to see how narcotics possession, although admit-
tedly apotential public danger if it should amount to distribution, is an
imminent danger requiring immediate attention. Ruling out such nar-
cotic-related stops does not render peace officers incapable of fighting
109. See, ag., Brown v. State, 684 P.2d 874, 878 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Hubert v.
State, 638 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
110. But see Hubert, 638 P.2d at 686 (receiving stolen property from robbery the
night before satisfied the recency requirement since the public has "a strong and vital
interest in recovering property stolen ... within the period of time immediately fol-
lowing commission of the offense.").
111. Id See also MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROC. § 110.2(1)(b)
(1975).
112. The court of appeals recently acknowledged this danger, reversing the convic-
tion of a known drug trafficker because of an illegal seizure. Peschel v. State, 770 P.2d
1144, 1149-50 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). The court noted the importance of preserving
an individual's right to be free from unreasonable police intrusion, even at the expense
of a conviction: "In hindsight, Peschel can be seen as a drug trafficker who was de-
servedly stopped before his destination. There may seem to be little need for concern
over his convenience as a traveler. Yet procedures that we approve today will inevita-
bly become common practice tomorrow." Id at 1149-50. See also Waring v. State,
670 P.2d 357, 366 (Alaska 1983) ("The public has an interest in solving crime...
however, we think that this laudable end does not outweigh [the defendant's] constitu-
tional right not to be unlawfully seized.").
1990]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
the war on drugs. Recourse remains available in the ability of the
police to ask for identification and conduct an on-the-scene investiga-
tion question without detention, or by way of an arrest based on prob-
able cause.
It thus appears that the Alaska courts have not been completely
successful in administering Coleman as a bright line test. The two-
part analysis seems meaningless if the courts stretch it to include so-
cially unpopular activities that are not imminently dangerous. As will
be discussed below, Alaska courts have allowed other factors to bal-
ance against the Coleman prerequisite; Ebona has been decreasingly
cited as the courts have actually applied a test comprised of a case-by-
case determination of reasonableness.
D. G.B. and the "Flexible" Coleman Doctrine
Recent applications of the Coleman test have clearly followed a
multifactored, general reasonableness approach. In the twenty-four
years since Coleman, the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court
of Appeals have failed to provide significant guidance regarding what
suspected offenses are required for an "imminent public danger" or
"serious harm." 113 Instead, the courts have focused on delineating
generally acceptable and reasonable police conduct in light of the par-
ticular circumstances of each case. This delineation occurred through
the modification of Coleman to a four-factored balancing test. 114
The strongest statement of Coleman as a multifactored balancing
test came recently in State v. G.B.11 5 In G.B., a young man was seen
behind the counter of a video rental store. When confronted by an
employee, the young man ran from the store. The employee reported
a suspected theft to the police and an officer was dispatched to the
area. Soon after, the police officer spotted G.B., who matched the de-
scription of the store intruder. The officer stopped G.B. and asked
him to get inside the police car. Recognizing G.B.'s name in connec-
tion with a previous trespass, the officer conducted a pat-down search
which eventually led to the discovery of eight hundred dollars which
G.B. had stolen from the video store. '16
113. That is, the "bright lines" are not that bright. This guidance was called for
previously in the Alaska Law Review. See Feldman, supra note 26, at 120.
114. The balancing test initially was introduced into each prong of Coleman sepa-
rately. Within the reasonable suspicion prong, the extent and duration of the seizure
must be weighed against the reliability of the information available to the police.
Dionne v. State, 766 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). In the imminent public
danger prong, imminence and severity of danger were balanced to obtain a general
quantum of necessity. Hubert v. State, 638 P.2d 677, 685-86 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
115. 769 P.2d 452 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
116. Id at 453-54.
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In ruling on the validity of the investigative stop, the court, as it
had in Coleman, invoked Brennan's dissent in Adams. The court of-
fered a new, limiting interpretation of Brennan's dissent, however,
finding Brennan to have been primarily concerned with the extension
of Terry to possessory offenses. 117 The court also noted that no prior
case had been overturned solely because of the minor character of the
underlying offense. 118 The court, noting that Brown should not be
read too literally, 119 held that minor theft was sufficiently serious harm
to property to justify a police stop.120
The G.B. court characterized Coleman as being concerned pri-
marily with good faith police activity, noting that "the Coleman rule is
ultimately rooted in common sense and practicality." 121 The court
continued:
In each case, compliance with Coleman's requirement of recently
committed serious harm must be evaluated with a view toward the
fundamental concern of the Coleman court: the risk that an investi-
gative stop based on mere suspicion may be used as a pretext to
conduct a search for evidence. As indicated in Coleman, the funda-
mental inquiry in each case is whether "a prompt investigation
[was] required ... as a matter of practical necessity."' 122
The most significant result of G.B. and its progeny has been the
transformation of Coleman from a two-part test to a case-by-case anal-
ysis for overall reasonableness. G.B. interpreted Coleman as "espous-
ing a flexible approach based on practical necessity, rather than a rigid
standard of categorical exclusion."' 23 The court stated: "Coleman re-
quires a determination of the issue based on the circumstances in each
case. While the theoretical seriousness of the crime for which reason-
able suspicion exists is a significant factor in each case, it is not in itself
determinative."' 124
117. Id Cf supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text extending Coleman to pos-
sessory offenses. Perhaps this statement by the G.B. court signals the reestablishment
of a bright line test for possessory offenses.
118. Id at 455. But see Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 365-66 (Alaska 1983) (im-
pression that "something was wrong" not enough to satisfy first prong of Coleman);
Metzker v. State, 658 P.2d 147, 149 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (fails both prongs of
Coleman test; moose poaching not adequately harmful).
119. "That is not to say that the Coleman standard categorically precludes all in-
vestigative stops based on reasonable suspicion of minor theft." G.B., 769 P.2d at 455.
120. It was, apparently, not significant to the court that the officer did not know
the magnitude of the theft until after the money had been recovered. See id. at 456.
121. Id.
122. Id (citation omitted).




The G.BL court delineated a sliding scale which considered four
factors: (1) the gravity of the threat to public safety; (2) the immi-
nence of the threat; (3) the strength of the officer's suspicion; and (4)
the intrusiveness of the investigative stop.125 Thus, "[a] minimally in-
trusive stop based on solid information indicating that a crime is actu-
ally in progress or has just been completed may be justified under
Coleman even when the crime itself is not a felony and involves harm
that in other contexts might not seem particularly serious."'
126
The G.B. court disputed the notion that the Coleman prerequisite
could ever be a "bright line." Rather, it held that the "imminent pub-
lic danger or serious harm" standard required a case-by-case analysis
in order to be justly applied. The court stated:
The determination of the seriousness of harm to persons or property
in any given case is inherently relative.... From one perspective,
the line between misdemeanor and felony offenses may seem a sensi-
ble distinction between serious and nonserious harm; from another,
the fact that the legislature has chosen to characterize certain con-
duct as criminal, subjecting offenders to incarceration, would re-
quire that the harm resulting from all such criminal conduct be
deemed serious rather than incons quential.127
The G.J3. sliding scale of reasonableness thus differs from the nar-
row exclusion from probable cause which Coleman apparently advo-
cated. The effect of G.B. is that the imminent public danger
requirement, critical in the early interpretations of Coleman, 128 can
now be easily balanced away in situations involving strong suspicion,
although this cannot yet be done in situations of probable cause or
minor intrusiveness. In this way, the Alaska doctrine is identical to
the federal Terry doctrine.' 29 The distinctive characteristic of immi-
nent public danger is lost.
E. G.B.'s Flexible Approach
Recently, the Alaska Court of Appeals has followed G.B. 's flexi-
ble Coleman analysis rather than the categorical exclusion suggested
byEbona.13 0 In W. Gibson v. State,1 31 the police made an investigative
125. Id. at 456.
126. Id
127. Id. at 455.
128. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 154-165 and accompanying text. Both doctrines will allow
generally reasonable activity. Although this is consistent with a literal reading of the
reasonableness clause, it ignores the fact that the Coleman court limited what it con-
sidered reasonable.
130. Indeed, G.B. is cited almost every time Coleman is cited. See, e.g., Gutierres
v. State, 793 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). But see State v. Kendall, 794
P.2d 114, 115 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (citing Coleman only to define investigatory
stops; validity of stop not at issue).
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stop based upon the reasonable suspicion that Gibson had just vandal-
ized a pay telephone. 132 Applying Coleman, the court focused on the
"sole issue... [of] whether the crime of vandalizing a pay telephone
constituted imminent public danger or serious harm to property so as
to justify the investigative stop."' 133
The W. Gibson court, however, did not actually confine its analy-
sis to this question. Rather, the court held that G.B. was controlling
and quoted extensively from that opinion.134 The court then used a
balancing approach to remove any doubts about the seriousness of the
crime, noting that the crime had just occurred, the stop was minimally
intrusive, and the potential for an abusive, pretextual search was mini-
mal under the circumstances of the case.13 5 The stop was thus held
reasonable and valid.
As stated previously, the adoption of a case-by-case sliding scale
is not necessarily a victory for either fourth amendment ideology.13 6
Nevertheless, cases like W. Gibson suggest that the court of appeals
has not strictly enforced the "imminent public danger or serious
harm" factor, thus creating a sliding scale skewed toward the law en-
forcement goals. In light of recent decisions, it would be inappropriate
to refer to the requirement for imminent public danger or serious
harm as the Coleman "prerequisite" as was done in Ebona.137 It is
now more appropriately called the Coleman "factor."13 8
The recent case of Hayes v. State demonstrates this "prerequisite"
misnomer.1 39 In Hayes, the court affirmed the validity of an investiga-
tive stop based on a reasonable suspicion of outstanding traffic war-
rants - an offense not even the most law-and-order-minded citizen
would consider an imminent public danger or serious harm.14° The
131. 789 P.2d 383 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). This case will be referred to as W.
Gibson, to avoid confusion with T. Gibson v. State, 708 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985). See supra note 105.
132. W. Gibson, 789 P.2d at 383.
133. Id
134. Id. at 384.
135. Id
136. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
137. Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978). See supra note 82.
138. See G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 455 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). There may be two Cole-
man "factors" if imminence and severity of danger or harm are considered separately,
as G.B. suggests. Id.
139. 785 P.2d 33 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
140. In Hayes, the police were dispatched to break up a loud party. One of the
officers recognized Hayes, who was helping to disperse the party, from an arrest two
years earlier. The officer remembered running a check two months earlier which had
indicated Hayes' outstanding traffic warrants. The officer detained Hayes while he ran
another check. During the detention, a tab of LSD fell out of Hayes' shirt. Hayes was
charged with possession of a controlled substance. Hayes sought to suppress the LSD
as the result of an illegal seizure. Id. at 35.
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court once again quoted extensively from G.B. 141 and applied the four-
factored balance. The court held that the stop was valid and satisfied
the Coleman standard.142 However, the court's balancing appears du-
bious. Only one factor weighed strongly in favor of validation - the
relative lack of intrusion.143 Degree of suspicion weighed lightly; it
was based on a two-year-old identification and a two-month-old peru-
sal of the warrant file.144 The other two factors, imminence and sever-
ity of danger or harm, however, weigh heavily against the validation of
the stop. Outstanding traffic warrants are hardly a serious harm or
danger and there was no reason to believe that there was any immi-
nent threat in this situation.
Moreover, the stop in Hayes seems inappropriate in light of the
"fundamental inquiry" of "practical necessity."' 145 It was not neces-
sary to arrest Hayes at the party; it was merely convenient. It seems
that the court must have considered other factors weighing in favor of
the validity of the stop, such as the seriousness of the ultimate offense.
Also, it may have been significant that Hayes had a prior felony con-
viction and was on probation at the time of the stop. However demon-
strative of Hayes' true character these factors may have been, they
have no place in an analysis which is supposed to examine the objec-
tive beliefs of the police officer at the time the contact is first made.146
The Hayes analysis is therefore one of generic reasonableness
without special consideration for the Coleman factor. The investiga-
tive stop procedure which the court validated bears little resemblance
to the limited police procedure described in Coleman and originally
confined in ease law to dangerous felonies. 147 True, the detention was
minimally intrusive. It was, however, a seizure 48 and thus should
have been subject to Coleman's strict standards. The Hayes court thus
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id
143. Hayes was detained for only two minutes. Id
144. Id. at 35. Note that suspicion may have been reasonable but not so much as
to outweigh weaknesses in other factors.
145. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). See supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
146. The investigative stop must satisfy the Coleman criteria for the police officer's
original purpose and suspicion.
Although it is crucial for law officials to continue an investigation when sus-
picious facts warrant it, they cannot embark upon an investigatory course of
action 'in hope that something might turn up.' The public has an interest in
solving crime... [but] this laudable end does not outweigh [the accused's]
constitutional right not to be unlawfully seized.
Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 366 (Alaska 1983) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 605 (1975)).
147. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
148. Hayes, 785 P.2d at 36.
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blurred any bright line which may have existed between seizures and
other, less intrusive, brief detentions.
Some other recent cases illustrate a similar lack of emphasis on
the requirement of imminent public danger as a dominant factor in the
investigative stop analysis. Although these cases purport to apply
Coleman, they are more appropriately labeled "G.B. stop" cases.
In Smith v. State,149 for example, the court of appeals held that
driving while license suspended ("DWLS") was an adequate imminent
public danger to satisfy the Coleman prerequisite. In Smith, a state
trooper stopped Smith, the driver of "an automobile for which a 'lo-
cate' had been issued."' 150 Upon learning that Smith was not the regis-
tered owner of the car, for which the locate order had been issued, the
trooper continued to detain and investigate Smith, eventually learning
that she was DWLS.' 5 '
The court included Smith's stop under the coverage of its broad
Coleman doctrine. The court held that although DWLS does not al-
ways mean imminent public danger, DWLS can be enough on which
to base a reasonable suspicion of imminent public danger.152 This seri-
ousness was demonstrated by the fact that the legislature had made
DWLS a class A misdemeanor and not a minor traffic infraction. 5 3
The problem with a legislative intent argument such as this is that
it over-broadens the scope of Coleman. It could be argued that any
criminal legislation is enacted to prevent public danger. Any statutory
offense, except perhaps for the most innocuous, could be reasoned to
be a sufficient basis for an investigative stop. Such a proposition runs
counter to the language of Coleman. The Coleman court could easily
have chosen terms like "crimes" or even "felonies." But it did not.
To hold otherwise is substantially to ignore the requirement of "immi-
nent public danger" or "serious harm."
149. 756 P.2d 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
150. Id. at 914.
151. Id. at 915.
152. Id. at 915-16. After the officer learned that Smith was not the owner of the
car, the "locate" on the automobile's owner was no longer the basis of the stop. The
officer needed to establish an independent basis for Smith's investigative stop for the
detention to continue. See Howard v. State, 664 P.2d 603, 610 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)
(quoting State v. Watson, 165 Conn. 577, 585, 345 A.2d 532, 537 (1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1977)). In Smith, Smith was detained because she was unable to pro-
duce her driver's license.
153. Smith, 756 P.2d at 916. The court found it dispositive that an officer may not
know the reason for which the driver's license was suspended. The suspension possi-
bly could have been for a serious driving offense like reckless driving and the driver's
operation of the vehicle at any time "could then be" imminently dangerous. Thus,
any suspicion of imminent public danger could in fact be reasonable. Such reasoning




The Smith court's neglect of Coleman's definition of "reasonable"
seizures is demonstrated by the following statement: "Little purpose
would be served in requiring an officer... to confirm his reasonable
suspicion. . . by postponing any action until probable cause can be
obtained."' 154 The purpose served would be that of protecting the
constitutional rights of all people to be free from unreasonable
seizures. Tis goal is the fundamental interest balanced against crime
prevention activity in the investigative stop balance. However, instead
of giving the Coleman factor preeminent consideration as was done in
the early cases, the Smith court held that DWLS was potentially dan-
gerous enough based on the fact that a driver's license could be sus-
pended because of an inability to drive safely. Although this is a
plausible conclusion under a generic reasonableness analysis, it is less
consistent with Coleman reasonableness, which includes a special con-
cern for the severity of the underlying conduct.
Ozhuwan v. State 155 illustrates that the Coleman factor has be-
come a secondary consideration in the investigative stop analysis. In
Ozhuwan, a police officer boxed in two cars legally parked in a camp-
ground area which was reputedly a common location for underage
drinking.156 During the seizure, the officer discovered cocaine in the
possession of the defendant. 157 The court of appeals invalidated the
stop based on lack of reasonable suspicion; it did not suggest that un-
derage drinking might have been an inadequately severe offense to jus-
tify a stop in most situations. 58 It is possible, however, that under the
totality of the circumstances, the suspicion would have been reason-
able had it involved a more serious suspected offense.' 59
i
154. Id. Compare this statement in Smith to those of the court of appeals in Pes-
chel v. State, 770 P.2d 1144, 1150 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989), and Waring v. State, 670
P.2d 357, 366 (Alaska 1983), both of which are quoted supra note 113. See also State
v. Geiger, 430 N.W.2d 346 (N.D. 1988) (defendant stopped for driving while license
suspended). Justice Douglas warned in his Terry dissent that the investigative stop
doctrine would become expansive at the expense of fourth amendment protections.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There have been powerful hydraulic
pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the court to water down consti-
tutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand.").
155. 786 P.2d 918 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
156. Id. at 920.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 922.
159. The fact that the stop was not invalidated solely on the basis of the lack of
severity of underage drinking as an offense demonstrates the apparent lack of signifi-
cance of the Coleman factor. Underage drinking, a violation of Alaska Statute section
4.16.050.125, hardly seems like apublic danger. Yet, the court focused its decision on
the defect in reasonable suspicion. Compare the Ozhuwan court's analysis with that of
the court of appeals in Metzker v. State, 658 P.2d 147 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), which
was decided under an Ebona-style two-pronged analysis. Id. at 149. The court found
that both prongs of the test were not satisfied. Although the Ozhuwan court later
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It is interesting to note how the court of appeals' treatment of the
Coleman standard changed within the same opinion. After initially
stating both the Coleman doctrine' 6° and the G.B. test, 161 the
Ozhuwan court modified the applicable inquiry with each restatement.
The court restated the standard as both "suspicion of wrongdoing"' 62
and "reasonable suspicion of criminality"' 163 before holding that the
stop was not, as G.B. requires, "a practical necessity."'' 1
Coleman now stands as a doctrine to be cited and quoted by the
courts but without any real effect on the generic reasonableness in-
quiry. Despite the language in Coleman that its procedure is limited
to "certain cases," 65 it now appears that any suspected illegal activity
can be the basis for an investigative stop. Dangerous activities such as
sexual assault, drug trafficking and burglary are joined by vandalism
of a pay telephone, driving with a suspended license and outstanding
traffic warrants.
V. CAN COLEMAN SURVIVE'?
It may be too early, however, to completely relegate Coleman to
the doctrinal graveyard. It is possible that the imminent public danger
or serious harm element can be preserved as a significant factor in a
case-by-case sliding scale even if it is not a strict categorical exclusion.
To accomplish this, the courts must analyze this factor with precision
and give it special weight in each case, respecting the fact that the
stated that reasonable suspicion was absent, it initially and definitively holds that
moose poaching is not a valid Coleman prerequisite. Id. at 149-50. Ozhuwan thus
illustrates that courts are no longer as willing to address the imminent public danger
even when it appears to be a susceptible target.
Although the court invalidated the stop in Ozhuwan, investigative stops based on
reasonable suspicion of underage drinking are a fairly common procedure. See, ag.,
State v. Blount, No. I JU-S89-542 Cr (1st Jud. Dist. Juneau, filed July 28, 1989, dis-
missed by prosecutorial discretion Sept. 12, 1989); State v. O'Halloran, Case No. lJU-
S89-541 Cr (1st Jud. Dist. Juneau, fied Sept. 8, 1989) (motion to suppress dismissed
on legality of arrest; investigative stop not addressed).
160. The Coleman doctrine prohibits investigative stops unless there is a "reason-
able suspicion that imminent public danger existed or that serious harm to persons or
property had recently occurred." Ozhuwan, 786 P.2d at 920 (citing Coleman, 553
P.2d 40, 46 (1976)).
161. "The fundamental inquiry is whether 'a prompt investigation [was] required
S.. as a matter of practical necessity.' "Id. (quoting G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 456) (Alaska
Ct. App. 1989).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 922.
164. Id.
165. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46. For an additional example see Miller v. Dept. of
Motor Vehicles, 761 P.2d 117 (Alaska 1988), in which a Coleman stop investigating
"threats" was deemed valid.
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Coleman court considered it an integral requirement of
"reasonableness."
The Coleman factor of imminence was helpful in invalidating an
investigative stop in Allen v. State.166 The main defect of the stop was
its reliance on an anonymous and unverifiable tip, a basis which weak-
ened the strength of the reasonableness of the suspicion. 167 However,
the court also held that it was significant that harm was not imminent.
The court stated: "There was nothing to suggest that police could not
have observed the subject's vehicle in order to corroborate some of the
details of the informant's claim without endangering the public."' 68
Allen is significant in that the court even considered whether
there was any imminent threat in the commission of minor or vic-
tineless offenses.169 This was uncommon in previous decisions even
though imminence is necessarily a factor which a test based on practi-
cal necessity should consider. Thus, consciously preserving the Cole-
man factors in the sliding scale may help ensure that a true test of
practical necessity prevails.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Coleman standard for investigative stops will never be the
categorical exclusion it might have become. Instead, with the pro-
nouncement of a flexible standard in G.B. and subsequent applications
of the multifactored balance, the police may perform investigative
stops when there is suspicion of virtually any illegal activity. The
Alaska doctrine is thus, in practice, no more restrictive than the fed-
eral doctrine.
It is possible that Coleman can survive as a factor in a sliding
scale analysis. However, even if a court does consider the factors ofimminent public danger or serious harm to persons or property, it is
likely to find the factors of reasonableness of suspicion and proportion-
ality of intrusion as more determinative than the other factors of the
G.B. balance. As it stands, the G.B. doctrine, calling for a test of prac-
tical necessity and generic (not Coleman) reasonableness, prevails. As
applied, the test is generally permissive toward police behavior and
only secondarily concerned with article 1, section 14 protections. A
166. 781 P.2d 992 (Alaska Ct. App 1989).
167. Id. at 994.
168. Id. In Allen, the court used the following test: "The imminence and nature of
the danger presented by the conduct being investigated must be evaluated in light of
(1) the strength of an officer's reasonable suspicion and (2) the actual intrusiveness of
the investigative stop." Id. at 993. TheAllen court also cautioned against using a stop
as a pretext for an evidence search. Id.
169. Compare Allen with the stop in Smith, supra notes 153-55 and accompanying
text.
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proper reading of Coleman, at least until it is explicitly and completely
overruled, requires that the imminent danger and harm factors be spe-
cifically considered and given special weight in the reasonableness
analysis.
David A. Greene

